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of the statute would unquestionably tend to secure more effective protection of
20
society against this unsocial individual.
It is submitted that, providing this additional sanction factor is definitely
and unqualifiedly recognized by the courts in dealing with tort cases which
involve the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, the class of persons
for whose benefit the law was made should be liberally interpreted; and
attention should be focused on the general objective which the legislature
sought, and as a consequence broaden the class of harms intended to be
J. M. C.
prevented.

CONTRACTS-INSANrrY AS AFFECTING VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTs.-In a recent

case a father transferred $9,000 worth of bonds to his son in pursuance to an
agreement that the latter care for him the remainder of his life. Several
months later, after the father's death, the administrators of the estate brought
an action against the son for replevin of the bonds, claiming that the father had
been incapable of managing his own affairs, that the son had knowledge of this
fact, and that a guardian had been appointed for the father a few months
after the transfer. No allegation as to fraud or undue influence was made.
The son showed that there had been an attempted distribution of the bonds
but that this had failed, and that a short time thereafter the father came to
live with him; and that he then took the bonds as consideration for his promise
to keep the parent the remainder of his natural life. The Appellate Court
of Indiana affirmed a decision for the administrators upon the ground that
"where an unconscionable advantage is taken of persons of unsound mind
before they have been placed under guardianship, by one possessing knowledge
of such condition, the contract attempted to be entered into is absolutely invalid,
void, and of no force or effect."'
The Indiana courts have followed the majority rule of this country by
holding that a contract entered into by an insane person before an adjudica2
tion of insanity or before the appointment of a guardian is merely voidable.
20 As in Buenner Chair Co. v. Feulner (1901), 28 Ind. App. 479, 63 N. E.
239, the owner of a factory probably found it to be more economical to leave
his machinery unguarded even if it necessitated being subjected to an occasional fine. However, the court by holding him liable to an employee injured
by the unguarded machinery, perhaps changed his mind.
I Warner v. Warner (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 773.
19 Ind. 30; Somers v. Pumphrey (1865), 24
2 Crouse v. Holman (1862),
Ind. 231; Devin v. Scott (1870), 34 Ind. 67; Musselman v. Cravens (1874),
47 Ind. 1; Nichol v. Thomas (1876), 53 Ind. 42; Freed v. Brown (1876), 55
Ind. 310; Wray v. Chandler (1878), 64 Ind. 146; Hardenbrook v. Sherwood,
Guard. (1880), 72 Ind. 403; McClain v. Davis (1881), 77 Ind. 419; Schuff
v. Ransom (1881), 79 Ind. 458; Fay v. Burdett (1882), 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am.
Rep. 142; Copenrath v. Kienby (1882), 83 Ind. 18; Fulwider v. Ingels, Guard.
(1882), 87 Ind. 414; North-Western Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Blankenship
(1883), 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. Rep. 185; Physio-Medical College of Indiana v.
Wilkinson (1886), 108 Ind. 314, 9 N. E. 167; Bayer v. Berrymanj (1889),
123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. 249; Ashmead v. Reynolds (1890), 127 Ind. 441, 26
N. E. 80; Louisville, etc. Railway Co. v. Herr (1893), 135 Ind. 591, 35 N. E.
556; McMillan v. Deering & Co. (1894), 139 Ind. 70, 38 N. E. 398; Gellenwaters v. Campbell (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. E. 1041; Teegarden et ux v.

RECENT CASE NOTES
Conversely, a contract made after a judicial declaration of insanity or the
appointment of a guardian is absolutely void.S
Hence, since a contract made previous to judicial declaration of insanity
is merely voidable, as a condition precedent to setting the contract aside there
must be a return of the consideration received-a restoration of the other
party to his status quo-before the insane person will be permitted to dis4
However, if the other party cannot be restored to his
affirm his contract.
status quo relief is refused, not so much that the agreement possesses the
legal essential of consent as because by means of an apparent contract, the
insane party has secured an advantage or benefit which would be inequitable
5
for him or those in privity with him to retain.
Undoubtedly, to hold that all such agreements entered into by an insane
party are void (a position taken by a few of the states) would lead to consistency;6 yet, any inconveniences or hardships can be averted by the swift
formal inquisition of lunacy.7 Judicial action constitutes conclusive evidence
8
that a person is incapable of contracting, but until such time the presumption
9
The presumption of competency is not negated by
of competency continues.
reasonable knowledge of the disability of the insane party in absence of
judicial declaration. The requisite of either judicial finding of insanity or
appointment of a guardian is paramount even to actual knowledge of the
condition of the incompetent party and contracts made under such circum0
stances are still held to be but voidable.1 Thus, a holding that a contract is
Lewis, Admin. (1895), 145 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 1047, 44- N. E. 9; Thrash v.
Starbuck (1896), 145 Ind. 673, 44 N. E. 543; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sellers
(1899), 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. 97, 77 Am. St. 481; Downham v. Holloway
(1902), 158 Ind. 626, 64 N. 1. 82, 92 Am. St. 330; Haskell v. Barker Car Co.
(1909), 71 Ind. App. 69, 123 N. E. 818; Gwinn v. Hobbs (1913), 72 Ind. App.
439, 118 N. E. 155.
8 Ibid. n. 2.
4
Nichol v. Thomas (1876), 53 Ind. 42; Schuff v. Ransom (1881), 79 Ind.
458; Fay v. Burdett (1882), 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am. Rep. 142; Hull v. Louth
(1887), 109 Ind. 315, 10 N. E. 270, 58 Am. Rep. 405; Ashmead v. Reynolds
(1890), 127 Ind. 441, 26 N. E. 80; Louisville,. etc. Railway Co. v. Herr (1893),
135 Ind. 591, 35 N. E. 556; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sellers (1899), 154 Ind.
370, 56 N. E. 97, 77 Am. St. 481; Downham v. Holloway (1902), 158 Ind.
626, 64 N. E. 82, .92 Am. St. 330; Barkley v. Barkly (1914), 182 Ind. 322,
106 N. E. 609, L. R. A. 1915B, 678; Voris v. Harshbarger (1895), 11 Ind. App.
55, 39 N. E. 521; Gwinn v. Hobbs (1913), 72 Ind. App. 439, 118 N. E. 155.
546 A. L. R. 422.
6 32 Columbia Law Review 512.
7 46 A. L. R. 423.
8 Nichol v. Thomas (1876), 53 Ind. 42.
9 Folz v. Wert (1885), 103 Ind. 404, 2 N. E. 950.
10 Nichol v. Thomas (1876), 53 Ind. 42. (Insane person made deed out
to grantor who knew of the incapacity of his grantor. The contract was held
to be voidable and could only be disaffirmed upon restoration of the grantee
(Son knew his
to his status quo.) Schuff v. Ransom (1881), 79 Ind. 458.
father was of unsound mind, and gave him nothing in exchange of his father's
contract to release him from a prior transaction. Later the son promised to
reserve to the father a certain house. Since no disaffirmance of the voidable
contract was shown, the court held the transaction to be binding.) Ashmead
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void because an "unconscionable advantage" has been secured by one who
is supposed to know of the disability inserts a new element in the law which
is unsupportable by our past Indiana precedents."1
Modifications of the seeming harshness in requiring court action to protect
an insane person are to be noted in several situations. One, where a lunatic
has not received the benefit of the consideration of his contract.12 Here, the
father received care and kindness from his son; thus the contract cannot be
set aside under this excepti6n. Too, where the contract is still executory the
agreement will not be enforced since no consideration has passed.' 3 Here,
there has been an actual exchange of consideration by each party.
In conclusion, the phrase "the shield should not be turned into a sword"
should apply in these cases. It should be the duty of friends or relatives of
an insane person to have a guardian appointed or a judicial finding of
insanity rendered, and for failure to have either of these done the burdens
should rest with them.
W. E. 0.
v. Reynolds (1890), 127 Ind. 441, 26 N. E. 80. (By "undue persuasion, corrupt
and overpowering influence" appellant nephew, knowing of the enfeebled
condition of his uncle's mind, procured an agreement giving the nephew land
worth $9,000, for which the nephew gave no consideration. No guardian had
been appointed. The court held for the nephew, saying that knowledge of the
appellee's (the uncle) condition did not render disaffirmance unnecessary.)
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Sellers (1899), 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. 97, 77
Am. St. 481. ("Whether the beneficiary was ignorant of the grantor's infirmity
or whether he obtained the benefits by means of knowledge of the disability,
until disaffirmed, such contract passes a right or title as fully as an unimpeached contract.") Louisville, etc. Railway Co. v. Herr (1893), 135 Ind. 591,
35 N. E. 556. (R. R. Co. secured release from all claims for injuries caused
by its train, for $500 cash and a year's pass. Later the injured party sued
and got judgment for $7,000 for personal injuries. Held: in spite of knowledge
by the railroad of the fact that the other party was non compos mentis, a
voidable contract existed, and until disaffirmance and restoration to status quo,
such was binding.)
"1 Ibid n. 10.
12North-Western Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Blankenship (1884), 94
Ind. 535, 48 Am. Rep. 185; Physio-Medical College v. Wilkinson (1886), 108
Ind. 314, 9 N. E. 167; Hull v. Louth (1887), 109 Ind. 315, 10 N. E. 270, 58
Am. Rep. 405.
13 Wells v. Wells (1926), 197 Ind. 236, 150 N. E. 361.

